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Case No. 20080662 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Russell Hurt, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine), a third degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Defendant was a passenger in a car stopped for a traffic violation that resulted 
in the driver's arrest on an outstanding warrant. Defendant was detained pending a 
search of the passenger compartment incident to the driver's arrest. Prior to 
conducting that search, Trooper Wurtz ordered defendant out of the car and asked 
if he had any weapons, which questioning lead to the discovery of drugs and 
paraphernalia on defendant's person. 
1. Were officers justified in searching the passenger compartment of the 
vehicle on the ground that defendant, who was not secured, could gain access to the 
car and retrieve a weapon or destroy evidence? 
Standard of Review. The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to 
grant or deny a motion to suppress are reviewed for clear error. State v. Krukowski, 
2004 UT 94, Tf 11,100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed 
non-deferentially for correctness, including its application of the legal standard to 
the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, Tf 15,103 P.3d 699. 
2. Can defendant prevail on his challenge to the trial court's admission of the 
drug evidence, where he does not acknowledge or attack the basis of the trial court's 
ruling, that he voluntarily consented to the search of his person? 
Standard of Review. Since defendant does not challenge the basis for the trial 
court's ruling admitting the drug evidence, no standard of review applies. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U. S. CONST. Amend IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
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UtahR.App. P. 24(a)(9): 
An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons 
of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the 
grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. 
A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record 
evidence that supports the challenged finding. . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charge. Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine, a 
third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 
2008), and possession of paraphernalia, class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5(l) (West Supp. 2008). R6-5. 
Motion to suppress denied. Defendant moved to suppress 
methamphetamine and paraphernalia seized during a warrantless search of his 
person. R31-27. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that defendant 
voluntarily consented to the search. R66-62 (a copy of the trial court's "Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress" is 
attached in addendum A). 
Plea bargain and conditional guilty plea. Defendant entered a conditional 
guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine, a third degree felony, and the 
paraphernalia charge was dismissed. R76-70. 
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Sentence. The trial court imposed an indeterminate term of from zero-to-five 
years. R92. The trial court then stayed imposition of the prison term and placed 
defendant on a 36-month term of probation. Id. 
Timely appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R94. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The trial court entered the following factual findings in support of its ruling 
denying the motion to suppress: 
1. On August 20, 2007, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Trooper David 
Wurtz of the Utah Highway Patrol was patrolling in the area of SR 248 
mile marker 6, in Wasatch County. 
2. Trooper Wurtz observed a black, Volkswagen Jetta traveling 87 
miles per hour in a 65 mile per hour zone. 
3. Trooper Wurtz executed a traffic stop on the vehicle and 
approached the driver side. 
4. After obtaining identifying information of the driver, Grant Black, 
Trooper Wurtz ran the driver for warrants. Trooper Wurtz was told by 
dispatch that Mr. Black had a $1,000 warrant for his arrest, and to use 
caution because Mr. Black had prior involvements with drugs, 
specifically methamphetamine. Upon receiving this information, 
Trooper Wurtz placed Mr. Black under arrest. 
5. Trooper Wurtz then spoke with the passenger, the defendant, 
inquiring as to whether he would be willing to take Mr. Black's vehicle. 
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The defendant did not have a driver's license in his possession, and a 
subsequent license check confirmed that his license was not valid, f1] 
6. At this time, Trooper Wurtz asked the defendant to step out of the 
vehicle so that the vehicle could be searched incident to arrest, to which 
the defendant complied. 
7. Trooper Wurtz asked the defendant if he had any weapons on him, 
to which the defendant replied that he did not. 
8. The defendant testified at the suppression hearing that he does carry 
pocket knives on occasion, but that he does not own any firearms. 
9. Trooper Wurtz asked the defendant to pull his front pockets inside 
out so that he could confirm that the defendant did not have any 
weapons. [2] 
10. Tropper Wurtz then asked the defendant to turn around so that he 
could observe the defendant's back pockets. 
11. Trooper Wurtz testified at the suppression hearing that the 
defendant was wearing painter pants with pockets on the thigh area, 
and that he observed a hard eyeglass case approximately 1.5 inches 
thick and 6 [inches] long sticking out of the pocket. Trooper Wurtz 
testified that the eyeglass case was capable of containing a knife or 
small firearm. 
12. Trooper Wurtz then asked the defendant if he would pull out the 
eyeglass case and open it to confirm that there were no weapons inside, 
to which the defendant complied. However, the defendant opened 
and shut the case very quickly not allowing Trooper Wurtz an 
opportunity to see inside the eyeglass case. This behavior caused 
1
 When Trooper Wurtz informed Black that defendant could not drive his 
vehicle, Black "said he had already called his sister from Kamas and she was coming 
to pick up the vehicle." R99:7-8. 
2
 In response, defendant "pulled his front pockets out," revealing that he had 
no weapons therein. R99:8. 
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Trooper Wurtz to believe that the defendant was trying to obstruct his 
view of the inside of the eyeglass case and that the defendant was 
trying to hide something. 
13. Trooper Wurtz then asked the defendant to open the eyeglass case 
again so that he could confirm that there were no weapons inside the 
eyeglass case. The defendant complied with this request and Trooper 
Wurtz was able to observe drug paraphernalia inside the eyeglass case. 
The defendant then threw the eyeglass case on top of the vehicle. 
14. At no time did Trooper Wurtz execute a frisk of the defendant's 
person. 
15. Trooper Wurtz testified at the suppression hearing that at no time 
did he assert a claim of authority to search the defendant, or exhibit 
any force upon the defendant to get him to comply with his requests. 
16. Trooper Wurtz testified at the suppression hearing that the 
defendant showed no aggression, and was cooperative in all requests 
made of him. 
17. Trooper Wurtz testified at the suppression hearing that there were 
[three] other officers present at the scene, each arriving at different 
times, including another UHP trooper, and two Summit County 
deputies. Both Summit County deputies were not actively involved in 
the stop as the location was just outside their jurisdiction. 
18. The defendant testified that he had a dog in the vehicle at the time 
of the stop, and that the two Summit County deputies retrieved the 
dog from him. 
19. Trooper Wurtz testified at the suppression hearing that his intent 
was to execute a search of Mr. Black's vehicle incident to arrest, along 
with the other UHP trooper, and therefore he had officer safety 
concerns with his back being turned to the defendant during the search 
and his inability to maintain a constant visual on the defendant during 
the search of the vehicle. 
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20. Trooper Wurtz testified that in his experience it takes only seconds 
for an individual to assault a police officer. 
21. The Court found at the suppression hearing that Trooper Wurtz 
could have conducted the search of the vehicle on his own and that the 
other UHP trooper could have maintained a visual on the defendant 
during the search of the vehicle. 
22. The defendant has no prior felony convictions, but does have two 
prior convictions for domestic violence assault, and one prior 
conviction for making a false report. 
R66-63. 
Based on these findings, the trial court ruled that 1) Trooper Wurtz lawfully 
ordered defendant out of the vehicle, 2) defendant was lawfully detained pending a 
search of the passenger compartment incident to the driver's arrest, and that 3) the 
drug evidence found on defendant's person ''was seized pursuant to the consent of 
the defendant." R63. In support of its consent ruling, the trial court reiterated 
that the officer did not command defendant to produce the eyeglass 
case in which the contraband was discovered. There was no show of 
force used by the officer; there was an absence of a claim of authority to 
search, the [defendant cooperated with the request of the officer, and 
there was an absence of deception or trick. 
Id. (a copy of the trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress, is included in Addendum A). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. The trial court ruled that defendant, a passenger, was lawfully 
detained incident to the traffic stop of the driver, pending a search of the 
passenger compartment of the vehicle incident to the driver's arrest. Since the 
trial court ruled in this case, however, the United States Supreme Court has held 
in Arizona v. Gant, a case that did not involve any passengers, that officers may 
search a vehicle incident to the driver's arrest only if the driver/arrestee is within 
reaching distance of the vehicle at the time of the search, or the officer has reason 
to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. These 
justifications for a passenger compartment search of the vehicle do not exist on 
this record. Nevertheless, officers here were justified in searching the passenger 
compartment incident to the driver's arrest on the ground that defendant, an 
unsecured passenger, could gain access to the car and retrieve a weapon or 
destroy evidence. Defendant's detention following the driver's arrest was 
therefore lawful. Gant does not control the outcome. 
Even assuming, however, that Gant applies even where there is an 
unsecured passenger present, Gant constitutes a new rule of Fourth Amendment 
law that should not be applied retroactively. 
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Alternatively, even if Gant applies when there is an unsecured passenger, 
and is also retroactive, defendant's detention was justified on the ground that 
there was further need to control the scene. The United States Supreme Court 
also recently clarified in Arizona v. Johnson, that passengers are reasonably 
detained incident to a traffic stop until there is no further need to control the 
scene. There was further need to control the scene here because officers were 
required to remain on the scene at least until the driver's sister arrived to retrieve 
the vehicle. Releasing defendant prior to the sister's arrival would have 
unnecessarily jeopardized their safety. The Fourth Amendment does not require 
this. 
Point II. Defendant's challenge to the trial court's ruling that he consented 
to the search of his person is inadequately briefed. Defendant ignores the 
consent basis of the trial court's ruling, asserting only that Trooper Wurtz lacked 
reasonable suspicion to conduct a weapons frisk. Consequently, defendant's 
challenge to the trial court's ruling is inadequately briefed and should be rejected 
on that ground. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
OFFICERS WERE JUSTIFIED IN SEARCHING THE PASSENGER 
COMPARTMENT OF THE VEHICLE ON THE GROUND THAT 
DEFENDANT, AN UNSECURED PASSENGER, COULD GAIN 
ACCESS TO THE CAR AND RETRIEVE A WEAPON OR DESTROY 
EVIDENCE 
In Point I of his brief, defendant challenges the trial court's ruling that he was 
lawfully detained pending a search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle 
incident to the driver's arrest. Aplt. Br. at 6-9. According to defendatnt, continued 
detention of passengers following the driver's arrest is justified only upon a 
showing of reasonable suspicion that they are engaged in criminal activity, or that 
they may be armed and dangerous. Id. Defendant's claim lacks merit and should 
therefore be rejected. 
A, New York v. Belton is not limited by Arizona v. Gant where, as 
here, there is an unsecured passenger. 
As noted, after the trial court ruled here, the United States Supreme Court 
held that police officers may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident 
to the driver's arrest only when the arrestee is within reaching distance of the 
vehicle, or there is reason to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense 
of arrest. Arizona v. Gant, S.Ct. , 129 S.Ct. 1719,1714 (limiting New York v. 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)). Here, the driver was secured in Trooper Wurtz's patrol 
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car before officers attempted to search the passenger compartment of the vehicle, see 
R65; see also R99:7. And Trooper Wurtz had no reason to believe that the vehicle 
contained evidence of the driver's suspended driving privilege. Therefore, neither 
of Gant's stated justifications for searching the passenger compartment incident to 
the driver's arrest is present here. 
Before Gant, Belton was read to allow a search of the passenger compartment 
of the vehicle incident to the driver's arrest regardless of whether the arrestee was 
secured. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 466, 468 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting majority 
rests on "fiction . . . that the interior of a car is always within the immediate control 
of an arrestee who has recently been in the car," and asserting under majority 
approach, "the result would presumably be the same even if [the officer] had 
handcuffed Belton and his companions in the patrol car before placing them under 
arrest"); see also Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1718,1719 (observing "Justice Brennan's reading of 
[Belton] has predominated," and "[u]nder this broad reading of Belton, a vehicle 
search would be authorized incident to every arrest of a recent occupant 
notwithstanding that in most cases the vehicle's passenger compartment will not be 
within the arrestee's reach at the time of the search"); State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 
1203 (Utah 1995) (recognizing Belton authorizes officers to search arrestee and "his 
or her vehicle"). 
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Although Gant limits Belton, Gant does not limit Belton's application here, 
because Gant is distinguishable on its facts. Unlike the instant case, Gant was the 
sole occupant of his vehicle. See Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1715. Therefore, once Gant was 
secured in the back of the patrol car, there was no danger he would reach into the 
car to grab a weapon or destroy evidence. Id. at 1719. Here, however, the car had 
two occupants: the driver and defendant. R65. Only the former was arrested. Id. 
As pointed out by Justice Alito, "it is not uncommon for an officer to arrest some but 
not all of the occupants of a vehicle/7 Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1731, n.2 (Alito, J., dissenting, 
joined by Roberts, C.J., Kennedy, J., & Breyer, J.). As further noted by Justice Alito, 
the Gant majority "does not address the question whether in such a situation a 
search of the passenger compartment may be justified on the ground that the 
occupants who are not arrested could gain access to the car and retrieve a weapon 
or destroy evidence/' Id. Accordingly, Gant does not limit Belton's application 
where, as here, there is an unsecured passenger. Id. Indeed, an unsecured 
passenger presents the same danger as an unsecured driver/arrestee, both of whom 
"could gain access to the car and retrieve a weapon or destroy evidence." Id. 
Arizona v. Johnson, U.S. , 129 S.Ct. 781 (2009), further supports the 
lawfulness of defendant's detention. In Johnson, the United States Supreme Court 
clarified that passengers are reasonably detained incident to a traffic: stop "for the 
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duration of the stop" or until "[officers] have no further need to control the scene, 
and inform the driver and passengers they are free to leave." 129 S.Ct. at 788 (citing 
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 258 (2007)). As explained, Belton still applies 
when an unsecured passenger is present, even if the driver/arrestee is secured. It 
necessarily follows that the officers had "further need to control the scene," or to 
detain defendant until the passenger compartment search could be safely 
concluded. Johnson, 129 S.Ct. at 788. Any other rule would unnecessarily jeopardize 
officer safety. The Fourth Amendment does not require this. See, e.g., Pennsylvania 
v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) (recognizing "too plain for argument" public 
interest in officer safety "both legitimate and weighty"). 
The Supreme Court's clear concern for officer safety during traffic stops, 
expressed most recently in Johnson, is dispositive here. The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly recognized that ""[t]he risk of harm to both the police and the occupants 
[of a stopped vehicle] is minimized, . . . if the officers routinely exercise 
unquestioned command of the situation."" Johnson, 129 S.Ct. at 786 (quoting 
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997) (in turn quoting Michigan v. Summers, 
452 U.S. 692, 702-03 (1981)) and citing Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 258 (recognizing 
"reasonable for passengers to expect that an officer at the scene of a crime, arrest, or 
13 
investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his 
safety")). 
Once an arrest is initiated, the risk to officer safety only increases. See United 
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,234-35 (1973) (recognizing "danger to an officer is far 
greater in the case of the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect in 
to custody and transporting him to the police station than in the case of the 
relatively fleeting contact resulting from the typical Terry-type stop"); accord Knowles 
v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113,117 (1998). The increased potential for danger encompasses 
passengers, who are "every bit" as motivated as an arrested driver, "to employ 
violence to prevent apprehension of . . . a crime." Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414; see also 
Maryland v. Fring\e, 540 U.S. 366, 373 (2003) (noting passengers ''will often be 
engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and have the same interest in 
concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing" (case citation and 
quotation marks omitted). 
The United States Supreme Court's concern for officer safety is not 
illusory. The most recent data reveals that in 2007, 6,424 officers were assaulted 
and eleven were killed during traffic pursuits or stops. See Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports: Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, 
Tables 19 & 68 (2007) ("Uniform Crime Reports") (found at http:/ www.fbi.gov/ 
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ucr/killed/2007/ data/table_19. html & http:/www.fbi.gov/ ucr/killed/2007/ 
data/table _68.html). One of the murdered officers was killed while searching 
the offender's vehicle. See Uniform Crime Reports, Table 24 (found at h t t p : / / 
www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/ 2007/data/table_24. html). Utah law enforcement 
officers are not immune from this danger. See Sara Israelsen-Hartley, Lehi Officer 
shot: Police kill woman who opened fire, Deseret News, 24 June 2008, and Melinda 
Rogers and Nate Carlisle, Woman killed after shooting Lehi cop liad histoiy of mental 
illness, The Salt Lake Tribune, 24 June 2008 (copies of both articles are attached in 
addendum B). 
Given the above, defendant's reliance on State v. Baker, 2008 UT App 115, f 
12,182 P.3d 935, cert granted, 182 P.3d 935 (Utah 2008), is unavailing.3 Baker held 
that "from the moment the driver was placed under arrest/7 in that case, there 
was "no lawful reason why the passengers were detained." 2008 UT App 115, 
Tf Tf 19,12. Baker's holding, that passengers are unreasonably detained once the 
driver is formally arrested, id. at \ 12, can only make an already dangerous 
situation more dangerous. Johnson makes plain that the Fourth Amendment 
3
 The Utah Supreme Court heard oral argument in Baker, and a certified 
companion case dealing with the same passenger detention issue, State v. Gettling, 
Case No. 20080037-SC, on 3 March 2009. The Supreme Court granted supplemental 
briefing re: Arizona v. Gant, in both Baker and Gettling, on 14 May 2009. 
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does not require this. 129 S.Ct. at 788. Therefore, to the extent that Baker conflicts 
with the holding in Johnson, that passengers are lawfully detained incident to a 
traffic stop until there is no "further need to control the scene/7 Baker has been 
effectively overruled. Johnson, 129 S.Ct. at 788. 
In sum, because defendant was an unsecured passenger, Gant does not 
apply and Trooper Wurtz remained authorized under Belton and Johnson to 
search the passenger compartment incident to the driver's arrest—regardless of 
whether the driver/arrestee was secured. The trial court's ruling should 
therefore be upheld. 
B. Arizona v. Gant is a new rule of Fourth Amendment law that 
should not have retroactive application. 
Even assuming arguendo that Gant controls here, Gant constitutes a clear 
break with Belton, or a new rule of Fourth Amendment law that should not have 
retroactive application. 
In asserting that Gant should not apply retroactively here, the State recognizes 
that in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), the United States Supreme Court did 
away with the "'clear break' exception to the general proposition that new rules 
governing criminal procedures should be retroactive to cases pending on direct 
review." Id. at 326, 328. Under the clear break exception, "a new constitutional rule 
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was not applied retroactively, even to cases on direct review, if the new rule 
explicitly overruled a past precedent of [the] Court, or disapproved a practice [the] 
Court had arguably sanctioned in prior cases, or overturned a longstanding practice 
that lower courts had uniformly approved/' Id. at 325 (citing United States v. 
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 551 (1982)). 
In Griffith, the Supreme Court considered whether new rules regarding use of 
peremptory challenges imposed in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), applied "to 
litigation pending on direct state or federal review or not yet final when Batson was 
decided/' Griffith, 479 U.S. at 316. Although the new peremptory challenge rules 
imposed in Batson constituted a clear break with Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 
(1965), the Supreme Court declined to except Batson from the general rule of 
retroactive application, holding instead that "a new rule for the conduct of criminal 
prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on 
direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule 
constitutes a 'clear break' with the past." Id. at 328. In so holding, the Supreme 
Court emphasized that application of the clear break exception resulted 1) in case-
specific analysis that was inappropriate when deciding whether a new rule applied 
retroactively to cases pending on direct review, and 2) in the uneven administration 
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of justice, because similarly situated defendants end up being treated dissimilarly. 
M a t 327. 
Because Griffith was a jury selection case, however, the Supreme Court did not 
there consider the ramifications of applying new rules of Fourth Amendment law 
retroactively. Where the remedy for a jury selection violation is a new trial, see id. at 
319, the remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation is suppression. See United States 
v. Herring, U.S. , 129 S.Ct. 695, 699 (2009) ("[Ojur decisions establish an 
exclusionary rule that, when applicable, forbids the use of improperly obtained 
evidence at trial"). "[The] judicially created [exclusionary] rule is 'designed to 
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect/" not to 
make the defendant whole. Id. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 
(1974)). 
Accordingly, the culpability of officer conduct must be considered when 
analyzing the applicability of the exclusionary rule in a given case. Id. (citing United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 n.4 (1984)). The exclusionary rule applies only to 
flagrant or deliberate Fourth Amendment violations, or "only if it can be said that 
the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with 
knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional." Id. at 701 (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 
480 U.S. 340, 348-49 (1987)). "The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation 
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occurred — i.e., that a search or arrest was unreasonable — does not necessarily mean 
that the exclusionary rule applies." Id. at 700 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,223 
(1983)). Indeed, exclusion is a "'last resort/" not a "'first impulse.'" Id. (quoting 
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006)). Moreover, because the exclusionary 
rule is not an individual right, it is applied only when it will effectively "deter[ ] 
Fourth Amendment violations in the future." Id. (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 
U.S. 338, 347-355 (1974); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976)). Finally, "the 
benefits of deterrence must outweigh the costs." Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 910). 
The exclusionary rule should not therefore apply where it can provide only 
"marginal" or "incremental deterrence." Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation 
and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) and Krull, 480 U.S. at 352-53). This is 
particularly true given the "'substantial societal costs'" of the rule, i.e., "letting 
guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free — something that 'offends basic 
concepts of the criminal justice system.'" Id. at 700-01 (quoting Krull, 480 U.S. at 352-
53 and Leon, 468 U.S. at 908). 
Where, as here, officers were, at the time, authorized by Belton to conduct a 
search of the passenger compartment incident to the driver's arrest, even if the 
arrestee was secured, Trooper Wurtz "did nothing improper." Herring, 129 S.Ct. at 
700. Because there was no culpable conduct on the part of Trooper Wurtz when he 
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acted here, "'the extreme sanction of exclusion'" is unjustified. Id. (quoting Leon, 468 
U.S. at 916). This is true even if, in hindsight, a Fourth Amendment violation in fact 
occurred, given Gant's subsequent limitation of Belton. 
Indeed, in Herring, an officer relied on an arrest warrant that was 
subsequently found to have been recalled, but which recall did not appear in the 
computer database. Id. at 698. The Supreme Court acknowledged that a Fourth 
Amendment violation occurred, but declined to apply the exclusionary rule to what 
was at most a negligent failure to act, rather than a deliberate or tactical choice to 
act: "[T]his error is not enough by itself to require 'the extreme sanction of 
exclusion.'" Id. at 700 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 916). 
If the exclusionary rule does not apply to negligent officer conduct like that at 
issue in Herring, it necessarily follows that it does not apply to non-culpable officer 
conduct like that at issue here. See Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-50 (declining to apply 
exclusionary rule to suppress fruits of warrantless administrative search performed 
in good-faith reliance on statute later declared unconstitutional). Indeed, before 
Gant, it was "widely accepted" that Belton authorized a search of the passenger 
compartment of the vehicle incident to the driver's arrest, regardless of whether the 
arrestee was secured. Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1722, n. 11; see also United States v. Thornton, 
541 U.S. 615, 628 (2004) (Scalia, J., with Ginsburg, J., concurring) (observing "cases 
involving this precise factual scenario — a motorist handcuffed and secured in the 
back of a squad car when the search takes place — are legion"); State v. Harmon, 910 
P.2d 1196,1203 (Utah 1995) ("[A]ny full custodial arrest, even for a inisdemeanor 
traffic violation, allows an officer to conduct a highly intrusive search of the arrested 
person,. . . and his or her vehicle/7 [Belton], 453 U.S. [at] 460"); Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 7.1(c), p.517, n.89 (4th ed. 2004 and Supp. 2008-2009) (collecting 
cases). 
Going forward, Gant instructs law enforcement officers as to the limits of a 
vehicle search incident to a driver's arrest, and violations of Gant will be subject to 
the exclusionary rule. But applying the exclusionary rule to officer conduct that was 
lawful before Gant "overturned a longstanding practice that lower courts had 
uniformly approved," Griffith, 479 U.S. at 325, can have only marginal or 
incremental deterrent value, if any. Herring, 129 S.Ct. at 700. It should not therefore 
be applied here. 
C. Alternatively, defendant's post-arrest detention was justified 
under Arizona v. Johnson because there was further need to 
control the scene, at least until the driver/arrestee's sister arrived 
to retrieve the vehicle, and presumably, defendant. 
Finally, even assuming that Gant applies when there is an unsecured 
passenger, and that Gant applies retroactively, defendant's detention following 
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the driver's arrest was nonetheless justified because he could not legally drive 
the car. There thus remained "further need to control the scene," at least until 
the car could be safely released to an authorized driver, moved to a temporary 
parking lot, or impounded. Johnson, 129 S.Ct. at 788. 
As noted, Johnson clarified that passengers are reasonably detained 
incident to a traffic stop "for the duration of the stop" or until "[officers] have no 
further need to control the scene, and inform the driver and passengers they are 
free to leave." Id. In so clarifying, the Supreme Court re-emphasized that ""[tjhe 
risk of harm to both the police and the occupants [of a stopped vehicle] is 
minimized, . . . if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the 
situation."" Id. at 786 (quoting Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414 (in turn quoting Summers, 
452 U.S. at 702-03)) (second brackets in original). The Supreme Court further 
clarified, moreover, that "[a]n officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the 
justification for the traffic s t o p , . . . do not convert the encounter into something 
other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend 
the duration of the stop." Id. (citing Muehler v. Menu, 544 U.S. 93,100-01 (2005)). 
Finally, it is well established that an officer may order a passenger out of the car 
pending completion of the stop. Wilson, 519 U.S. at 415. 
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Here, there was still "further need to control the scene" following the 
driver's arrest. Johnson, 129 S.Ct at 788. Defendant, who was not under arrest or 
otherwise secured, did not have a valid driver's license and could not therefore 
drive the vehicle away. See R95; see also R99:7-8. Although, the driver had called 
his sister in Kamas to retrieve his car, and presumably defendant, she had not yet 
arrived. See R95; see also R99:7-8. Trooper Wurtz was thus required to remain 
with the vehicle —and the unsecured defendant—until the driver's sister arrived 
to retrieve them, or the vehicle could be otherwise safely secured. Cf. State v. 
Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 268-69 (Utah 1985) (recognizing where passenger had no 
valid license, impounding car without first allowing arrestee/owner to arrange 
for a third-party to move it, as per department policy, was unreasonable). There 
was, thus, "further need to control the scene" following the driver's arrest. 
Johnson, 129 S.Ct. at 788. Cf. People v. Hoyos, 162 R3d 528, 546 (Cal. 2007) 
(upholding detention of driver and passenger reasonably seized following 
Mimms/Wilson order to exit vehicle "at least as long as reasonably necessary for 
the officer to complete the activity [an inventory search] the Mimms/Wilson order 
contemplates"). 
Accordingly, defendant continued to be lawfully detained when Trooper 
Wurtz ordered him from the car, queried him about weapons, observed a hard 
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glasses case protruding from his pants pocket that was large enough to conceal a 
knife or small firearm, and discovered drugs and paraphernalia therein. See R65. 
Defendant does not allege that Trooper Wurtz's questioning about weapons 
exceeded the scope of his detention. Aplt. Br. at 9-10. But in any event, as noted, 
"[a]n officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic 
s t o p , . . . do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful 
seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the 
stop/7 Johnson, 129 S.Ct. 781, 788 (citing Muehler, 544 U.S. at 100-101). Because 
defendant was lawfully detained at least until the driver's sister arrived to 
retrieve the vehicle, or it could be otherwise safely secured, the trooper's 
questioning did not, by any measure, extend the duration of the stop.4 
In sum, even if Gant controls here, defendant's continued detention was 
justified under Johnson on the ground that there was "further need to control the 
scene" following the driver's arrest. Johnson, 129 S.Ct. at 788; see also State v. 
Robison, 2006 UT 65,119,147 P.3d 448 (recognizing appellate court may affirm 
judgment below where sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on 
record, even though such ground or theory not considered by lower court). 
4
 The lawfulness of the search of the glasses case is addressed in Point II. 
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II. 
DEFENDANT CANNOT PREVAIL ON HIS CHALLENGE TO THE 
TRIAL COURT'S ADMISSION OF DRUG EVIDENCE FOUND ON 
HIS PERSON WHERE HE DOES NOT ACKNOWLEDGE OR 
ATTACK THE BASIS OF THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING, THAT 
HE VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH 
In Point II of his brief, defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his 
motion to suppress the drug evidence seized from his person. Aplt. Br. at 9-10. 
Defendant asserts that the warrantless search was unjustified because "Officer 
Wurtz did not testify as to any acts that might lead him to have a suspicion that 
[defendant] was armed and dangerous/7 Aplt. Br. at 9. Defendant's argument 
overlooks the basis of the trial court's ruling, which was that defendant voluntarily 
consented to the search of his person. See R66-63. Because defendant does not 
acknowledge, let alone attack, the basis for the trial court's ruling, his claim of error 
is inadequately briefed and should be rejected on that ground. 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires that the argument 
portion of appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing 
any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, 
and parts of the record relied on." 
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As Utah courts have frequently reiterated, "a reviewing court is entitled to 
have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a 
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research/7 State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, | 20, 63 P.3d 72 (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 
P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988) (in turn quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 
(111. App. Ct. 1981))). Thus, when the appellant fails to present any relevant 
authority, the reviewing court will "decline to find it for him." State v. Pritcliett, 2003 
UT 24, Tf 12,69 P.3d 1278 (rejecting prosecutorial misconduct challenge). Similarly, 
"[w]hen a party fails to offer any meaningful analysis, [the court will] decline to 
reach the merits/7 State v. Gamer, 2002 UT App 234, ^ 12,52 P.3d 467. An appellant 
must, in addition to citing cases, "explain why . . . the cases cited compel this court 
to reverse the district cour t . . . . " Id. 
"Utah courts routinely decline to consider inadequately briefed arguments." 
State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539,549 (Utah App. 1998) (citing State v. Wareliam, 772 P.2d 
960,966 (Utah 1989)); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341,1344 (Utah 1984); State v. Yates, 
834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah App. 
1992)); see also State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, f 28, 48 P.3d 872, cert denied, 535 U.S. 
1062 (2002); State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, f 13, 72 P.3d 138. 
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Where, as here, an appellant fails to attack the basis of the judgment below, 
his argument is inadequately briefed and the judgment should be affirmed. Cf. State 
v. Sorenson, 2004 UT App 381U, at *1 (affirming where Sorenson failed to challenge 
two of three bases for trial court ruling: "Sorenson does not challenge these 
determinations on appeal and, accordingly, we find no reason to reverse the trial 
court's denial of Sorenson's motion to suppress"); accord San Antonio Press, Inc. v. 
Custom Bilt Machinery, 852 S.W.12d 64, 65 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) ("When a separate 
and independent ground that supports a judgment is not challenged on appeal, the 
appellate court must affirm"); James v. Phoenix Gen. Hosp., Inc. 744 P.2d 689, 694 
(Ariz. 1986) (affirming judgment below on an uncontested issue); Shraeder v. Eli Lily 
& Co., 639 N.E.2d 258, 264 (Ind. 1994) (affirming judgment below "[b]ecause 
appellants have not successfully challenged one of the independent grounds 
supporting summary judgment"). 
Here, defendant's brief contains legal authority and analysis regarding the 
weapons frisk exception to the warrant requirement, but wholly fails to explain why 
the cited authorities compel this Court to reverse the trial court's ruling that no 
weapons frisk occurred, and that the warrantless search was justified by defendant's 
voluntary consent and cooperation. See R64-63. See also Aplt. Br. at 9-10. Because 
defendant fails to attack the basis of the trial court's admissibility ruling, or to 
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support his claim of error with relevant authority and meaningful analysis, it is 
inadequately briefed and should be rejected. See, e.g., Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, % 12; 
Gamer, 2002 UT App 234, If 12. Cf. Sorenson, 2004 UT App 381U, at *1; accord San 
Antonio Press, Inc., 852 S.W.2d at 65; James, 744 P.2d at 694; Shrader, 639 N.E.2d at 
264. 
Additionally," [c]onsent is a factual finding[.]. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 
48, 63 P.3d 650. Because defendant does not acknowledge, let alone challenge the 
trial court's findings regarding his voluntary consent, he is bound by them. See State 
v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, % 12,164 P.3d 397 (accepting trial court's factual findings as 
conclusive where Worwood "failed to actually challenge [the] factual finding by 
marshalling the evidence"); State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ^ 60,28 P.3d 1278 (noting 
party who wishes to challenge factual finding must first marshal supporting 
evidence and show why it fails to support finding). This Court recently refused to 
address any of an [appellant's] legal arguments that [were] entirely dependent on a 
version of the facts that [was] contrary to the trial court's findings." Burton Lumber 
& Hardware Co. v. Graham, 2008 UT App 207, ^ 13, P.3d . 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted 28 May 2009. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RUSSELL E. HURT, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 071500145 
Judge Derek Pullan 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on January 23, 2008 and February 27, 
2008 on Defendant's motion to suppress. Defendant was present and represented by counsel, 
Dana Facerayer and Sid Unrau. Plaintiff was represented by Tricia S. Lake. The Court, having 
received written memorandum, and heard evidence, makes and enters the following Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On August 20, 2007, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Trooper David Wurtz of the Utah 
Highway Patrol was patrolling in the area of SR 248 mile marker 6, in Wasatch County. 
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2. Trooper Wurtz observed a black, Volkswagen Jetta traveling 87 miles per hour in a 65 
mile per hour zone. 
3. Trooper Wurtz executed a traffic stop on the vehicle and approached the driver side. 
4. After obtaining identifying information of the driver, Grant Black, Trooper Wurtz ran the 
driver for warrants. Trooper Wurtz was told by dispatch that Mr. Black had a $1,000 warrant for 
his arrest, and to use caution because Mr. Black had prior involvements with drugs, specifically 
methamphetamine. Upon receiving this information, Trooper Wurtz placed Mr. Black under 
arrest. 
5. Trooper Wurtz then spoke with the passenger, the defendant, inquiring as to whether he 
would be willing to take Mr. Black's vehicle. The defendant did not have a driver's license in 
his possession, and a subsequent license check confirmed that his license wras not valid. 
6. At this time, Trooper Wurtz asked the defendant to step out of the vehicle so that the 
vehicle could be searched incident to arrest, to which the defendant complied. 
7. Trooper Wurtz asked the defendant if he had any weapons on him, to which the defendant 
replied that he did not. 
8. The defendant testified at the suppression hearing that he does carry pocket knives on 
occasion, but that he does not own any firearms. 
9. Trooper Wurtz asked the defendant to pull his front pockets inside out so that he could 
confirm that the defendant did not have any weapons. 
10. Trooper Wurtz then asked the defendant to turn around so that he could observe the 
defendant's back pockets. 
11. Trooper Wurtz testified at the suppression hearing that the defendant was wearing painter 
pants with pockets on the thigh area, and that he observed a hard eyeglass case approximately 1.5 
inches thick and 6" long sticking out of the pocket. Trooper Wurtz testified that the eyeglass 
case was capable of containing a knife or a small firearm. 
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12. Trooper Wurtz then asked the defendant if he would pull out the eyeglass case and open it 
to confirm that there were no weapons inside, to which the defendant complied. However, the 
defendant opened and shut the case very quickly not allowing Trooper Wurtz an opportunity to 
see inside the eyeglass case. This behavior caused Trooper Wurtz to believe that the defendant 
was trying to obstruct his view of the inside of the eyeglass case and that the defendant was 
trying to hide something. 
13. Trooper Wurtz then asked the defendant to open the eyeglass case again so that he could 
confirm that there were no weapons inside the eyeglass case. The defendant complied with this 
request and Trooper Wurtz was able to observe drug paraphernalia inside the eyeglass case. The 
defendant then threw the eyeglass case on top of the vehicle. 
14. At no time did Trooper Wurtz execute a frisk of the defendant's person. 
15. Trooper Wurtz testified at the suppression hearing that at no time did he assert a claim of 
authority to search the defendant, or exhibit any force upon the defendant to get him to comply 
with his requests. 
16. Trooper Wurtz testified at the suppression hearing that the defendant showed no 
aggression, and was cooperative in all requests made of him. 
17. Trooper Wurtz testified at the suppression hearing that there were 3 other officers present 
at the scene, each arriving at different times, including another UHP trooper, and two Summit 
County deputies. Both Summit County deputies were not actively involved in the stop as the 
location was outside their jurisdiction. 
18. The defendant testified that he had a dog in the vehicle at the time of the stop, and that the 
two summit county deputies retrieved the dog from him. 
19. Trooper Wurtz testified at the suppression hearing that his intent was to execute a search 
of Mr. Black's vehicle incident to arrest, along with the other UHP trooper, and therefore he had 
officer safety concerns with his back being turned to the defendant during the search and his 
inability to maintain a constant visual on the defendant during the search of the vehicle. 
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20. Trooper Wurtz testified that in his experience it takes only seconds for an individual to 
assault a peace officer. 
21. The Court found at the suppression hearing that Trooper Wurtz could have conducted the 
search of the vehicle on his own and that the other UHP trooper could have maintained a visual 
on the defendant during the search of the vehicle. 
22. The defendant has no prior felony convictions, but does have two prior convictions for 
domestic violence assault, and one prior conviction for making a false report. (See State's 
Exhibit 2) 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i. Once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the peace officer 
may order the driver and all passengers out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth 
Amendment's proscription against unreasonable seizures. That mle is set forth in Pennsylvania 
vs. Mimms case and Maryland vs. Wilson of the United States Supreme Court. 
2. That is what occurred in this case. Once the driver was placed into custody, the 
Defendant was asked to step out of the vehicle. This was necessary in order for the trooper to 
effect a search of the passenger apart from the vehicle incident to the driver's arrest. 
3. Having considered the testimony and having made Findings of Fact based on that 
testimony, I am satisfied that the evidence seized by Trooper Wurtz was seized pursuant to the 
consent of the defendant. 
4. I am not persuaded that the officer commanded the Defendant to produce the eyeglass 
case in which the contraband was discovered. There was no show of force used by the officer; 
there was an absence of a claim of authority to search, the Defendant cooperated with the request 
of the officer, and there was an absence of deception or trick. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, this Court 
hereby denies defendant's motion to suppress. 
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DATED this $ _ day of March, 2008. 
BY 
APPROVED AS T0TORM: 
i«* $ I 
Attorney for Defendant 
RULE 4-508 Notice 
You are hereby notified that the above Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress will be forwarded to the Court for signature eight days 
from the date that it was mailed to you unless you notify counsel for Plaintiff 
that you object to its form. __ _ <f""""*~? 
TRICIA S. LAKE, Attorney for Plaintiff 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress was: 
[ x ] mailed, first class postage pre-paid 
[ ] faxed to 
[ ] delivered 
On this f/T^ day of March, 2008, to the following: 
Dana M. Facemyer 
Attorney at Law 
3610 North University Avenue 
Jamestown Courtyard, Suite 375 
Provo,UT 84604 
V Zly/^LC ^ - W ^ ^ l V ~ 7 ^ 
Susan Johnson f 
Legal Secretary -
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Deseret News 
Lehi officer shot: Police kill woman who opene 
By Sara Xsraefsen-Hartley 
Deseret News 
LEHI — Lehi police officers and city officials are reeling from a shooting Monday morning that 
sent a veteran police captain to the hospital and brought back memories of the last officer they 
lost. 
Just before 9 a.m., police Capt. Harold Terry pulled over a female driver suspected of being 
impaired, after a gas-station clerk called 911 to report the woman had exhibited slurred speech 
and poor balance. 
After a short disagreement at the car window, the 34-year-old woman, who was still seated in 
the car, suddenly fired twice with a .38-caliber revolver, hitting Terry twice in the left side of the 
head, just above his ear. Terry was able to draw his gun and fire once into the car and back-up 
officers on scene fired five rounds at the woman, killing her. 
One bullet exited Terry's head and the other bullet and shrapnel were surgically removed late 
Monday morning at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, where he was reported to be resting 
in stable condition, surrounded by family and friends, said Lehi Police Sgt. Darren Paul. 
"This is a trying time for all of us. We're all very close," Paul said, as he stood in front of the 
police station that bears the name of the last officer they lost — Lt. Joseph Adams. Like Terry, 
Adams had also stopped a suspected impaired driver when he was killed in August 2001. 
The woman fatally shot Monday morning is from Washington state but was living in Provo and 
attending school in Utah County. 
Police have not released her name pending notification of her family. 
Officers cannot find any indication that the woman has a criminal record, nor do they believe 
she was the subject of a warrant. They will be conducting an autopsy and toxicology reports 
and searching her car to determine what may have caused her behavior, Paul said. 
A combined group of investigators and officials from the Utah County Attorney's Office will be 
reviewing the use of force by the Lehi officers. 
Traffic stops are considered the most dangerous encounters officers face," Paul said. "There 
are so many unknowns." 
Terry had followed the proper protocol for the stop at 1000 E. Main, in front of a busy gas 
station, Paul said. 
"He's a veteran leader here," Paul said. "He's very well respected and professional in how he 
carries out his duties." 
Although police captains are often found in an office behind a desk, Terry was out on the road 
and responded when he heard the dispatch report. 
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"Knowing Capt. Terry, I'm not a bit surprised," Paul said. "He leads by example." 
Terry has been with Lehi for 16 years and was promoted in February to captain over the patrol 
division, Paul said. 
As well as leading by example, Terry also trained and taught officers. 
He had just finished teaching one term of law enforcement operations at Provo College, which 
focuses on the day-to-day life of a police officer, said Ken Peay, program administrator for the 
criminal justice degree at Provo College. 
"Harold was an excellent teacher," Peay said. "He was really, really good with his students. I 
think he exemplifies the best of the best," Peay said. 
Terry had taken the summer semester off but planned to come back in the fall, Peay said. 
"He loved it," Peay said. "He was really good at it, you could tell how much he enjoyed it 
because of his demeanor in the classroom. ... He made the classes come to life with his 
experiences." 
Several students have called wanting to send messages or flowers to the family, Peay said. 
One of the experiences Terry shared with students included being involved in a shoot-out with a 
former police comrade, Art Henderson, who had chased his ex-wife and her boyfriend through a 
residential Lehi neighborhood, firing several shots at them in January/ 2006. 
Lehi officers took Henderson down with several shots to the leg, and he was arrested. 
Henderson was later charged with numerous felonies, including attempted aggravated murder, 
but his criminal case ended in April 2006 when he hanged himself in a cell at the Salt Lake 
Metro Jail. 
"It's hard to think that these men and women put their lives on the line," said Lehi Mayor 
Howard H. Johnson, who stopped by the station to share his love and support with the force. 
Johnson, too, mentioned Adams when he talked about Monday's shooting. The poignant 
memory of the fallen officer is something no one has forgotten. 
In the August 2001 shooting, Adams found a bag of cocaine in a car he had pulled over, told 
the driver he was under arrest and began to handcuff him. Somehow the driver got one hand 
free, grabbed a handgun from his belt and shot Adams. 
Although wounded in two places, Adams was able to return fire, hitting the man multiple times. 
With a handcuff dangling from one wrist, the shooter, Arturo Javier Scott Welch, got in his car 
and drove away, according to Utah County Sheriff's officials. He was captured by Salt Lake 
County Sheriffs deputies at a gas station in Draper. 
Welch, 23, pleaded guilty to aggravated murder the following year and was sentenced to life in 
prison without the possibility of parole. 
At the time of that shooting, Adams, a three-year member of the Lehi Police Department, was 
married and had an 8-month-old son. 
In the aftermath of Monday's shooting, the task now is to support and pray for Terry and his 
family, as well as the family in Washington that has lost a loved one, the mayor said. 
"Right now, we'll do the best we can, pray and hope the Lord sees fit to bless him extra," 
Johnson said. 
http://www.deseretnews.eom/article/content/mobile/l,5620,700237401.00 htmPnnntVi^i/ 
He extolled the police officers, saying that many people don't pick professions with inherent 
risks or obstacles. 
"But these good (officers) take a job that has them all," he said. "And they do it with a sense of 
cheer and happiness. We live in debt to them every day." 
E-mail: sisraelsen^desnews com 
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Her family thought meets had ailment under control 
Woman killed after shooting Lehi cop had his 
mental illness 
By Melinda Rogers and Nate Carlisle 
The Salt Lake Tribune 
Article Last Updated: 06/24/2008 01:31:56 PM MDT 
The family of Kelly Wark says the 34-year-old had been struggling with 
mental illness for several months before she opened fire on a Lehi police 
captain during a traffic stop Monday and was killed by return fire. 
"She had struggled with severe mental illness in the past year and was on 
her way to beginning a new life," Wark's parents, Robert and Mary Wark 
of Gig Harbor, Wash., wrote in a statement released today. "We offer our 
deepest condolences to the family of the officer that was hurt." 
Gwyn Vukich, a cousin of the Wark family who is serving as the Wark 
family's spokesperson, would not elaborate on specifics of Kelly Wark's 
mental illness. But she said her cousin was on medication, and that her 
death came as a shock for family who 
believed she had her illness under 
control. 
Wark had moved to Utah to attend massage therapy school and excelled 
at art, Vukich said. She specialized in portraits and had earned degrees in 
art and psychology from Western Washington University in Bellingham 
before she decided she wanted to become a massage therapist, Vukich said. 
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Her parents called Wrark a "gentle, kind and loving person" in the 
statement. 
Police say WTark shot Capt. Harold Terry twice in the head after he 
pulled her over in response to reports of a woman who might be driving under the infl 
hospitalized in serious condition this afternoon but is expected to make a full recover 
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